In recent years, the term ‘strategic corruption’ has gained traction across policy, academic, and advocacy circles. Coined to describe the use of corrupt practices as deliberate instruments of foreign policy, the concept has come into focus particularly since the escalation of geopolitical rivalries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet even as its usage has expanded, its precise meaning remains contested.

An expert workshop supported by the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF) and the University of Rijeka brought together scholars and practitioners to probe the concept’s boundaries, practical applications, and analytical utility. The discussions were rich, critical, and ultimately inconclusive—revealing just how much definitional and conceptual work remained to be done.

This blog post shares key insights from that workshop and draws on recent research, including my co-authored article with David Lewis in a special issue of Public Integrity (2025), to move toward a more grounded and precise understanding of what strategic corruption is—and what it is not.

What’s at Stake: Definitional Drift and Conceptual Uncertainty

The origin of the term ‘strategic corruption’ is closely linked to the securitisation of anti-corruption policy. An influential 2020 essay by Zelikow et al., ‘The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft’, cast the practice as an intentional tool of authoritarian foreign policy. This framing, embraced by the Biden administration, elevated transnational corruption to a national security priority in the United States.

Yet this shift, while welcome in some operational respects, came with conceptual costs. ‘Strategic corruption’ became a catch-all label, applied not only to the use of bribery and illicit finance, but also to cybercrime, disinformation, opaque investment, and elite capture. Often, these disparate activities were bundled together without clearly establishing the linkages—or the corruption. As one workshop participant put it, this risks turning the term into an empty vessel: rhetorically powerful but analytically slippery.

The Cres workshop discussions highlighted several ambiguities that need to be addressed for the concept to retain value. First, what is really new about strategic corruption? Is it the novelty of tactic—or their combination? Or is it the geopolitical context in which they are deployed?

Second, does the term sufficiently clarify the actors and mechanisms involved? Several participants questioned whether the concept overstates the coherence of state strategies and underplays the role of private networks, commercial actors, and hybrid entities. If everything from state-owned banks to cyber operations counts as strategic corruption, where do we draw the line?

Third, how useful is the dichotomy between authoritarian and democratic systems in this debate? Some argued that it is central, pointing to how authoritarian regimes leverage corruption abroad to weaken democracies. Others noted that democracies, too, engage in or enable corrupt practices abroad, and that the ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ framing may obscure more than it reveals. This remark has now been made more poignant by the current 180-degree reversal on anti-corruption policy by the Trump administration.

These tensions are also reflected in the growing academic literature on the topic. In their recent article in Public Integrity, Pozsgai-Alvarez and Lang (2025) outline four main strands of how the concept is used: strategy-oriented (focused on intentionality and state agency), tool-oriented (emphasising the corrupt instruments), effect-oriented (outcomes such as institutional destabilisation), and structure-oriented (underlying geopolitical or systemic drivers). Yet even these categories sometimes overlap or conflict.

What Strategic Corruption Is

In our own Public Integrity article, David Lewis and I argue that what is often referred to as strategic corruption is better understood as a subtype of networked corruption, that is, corruption embedded in transnational networks, involving both state and non-state actors, and reliant on a combination of legal and illegal tools. Not all networked corruption is strategic, however. The distinguishing feature is intent.

Strategic corruption, in this framing, refers specifically to the intentional use of cross-border corrupt practices by state actors, or non-state actors working on their behalf, to advance geopolitical objectives. The first point is the already-mentioned intent: actions may be diffuse, indirect, or outsourced to intermediaries, but they are not accidental or incidental. Rather, they are part of a broader political strategy. Second, strategic corruption tends to involve some degree of state involvement or direction. While private actors may play key roles, the activities are typically aligned with, or facilitated by, state institutions or foreign policy aims. This distinguishes it from purely profit-driven corruption. Third, strategic corruption is defined by its targeted function: it seeks to weaken democratic institutions, undermine governance frameworks, or realign a state’s international orientation or assert hegemony. This may involve manipulating electoral systems, co-opting elites, using military and security assets, or fostering dependency through illicit financial ties. The point is not merely to extract value, but to reshape political outcomes in the target country. An important caveat is that while such practices are often illegal, they may also take forms that are formally legal yet illicit in intent and effect.

What Strategic Corruption Is Not

Strategic corruption is not simply large-scale or international in scope. It is not the same as kleptocracy, though the two may overlap. It is not driven solely by economic gain, nor is it the result of uncoordinated, opportunistic behaviour. Without evidence of deliberate political intent and state alignment, the use of corrupt practices—even if consequential—should not automatically be classified as strategic corruption.

Why Definitional Precision Matters

A clearer, narrower definition of strategic corruption is vital for both research and policy. Without it, the term risks becoming a catch-all for malign foreign influence, used to justify reactive or securitised anti-corruption responses. It may also obscure the role played by domestic actors and Western enablers in facilitating corrupt flows. At its worst, it can end up being little more than a phrase used in propaganda, or it could even be used to paint political enemies as traitors without evidence to back up accusations.

By focusing on intent, state involvement, and political targeting, we can distinguish strategic corruption from adjacent concepts and build a typology that allows for more robust analysis and potential evidencing. This will be particularly useful to any actors wishing to develop better, more effective responses to the threat.

This clarity also opens the door to comparative research: How do different states deploy strategic corruption? What tools do they favour, and under what conditions does it work? The Cres workshop showed that we are only at the beginning of understanding this phenomenon. Pinning down its meaning allows us to move past slogans and start asking harder questions about evidence, mechanisms, and impact. The discussion is far from over, but this post is a step toward sharpening the concept—and an invitation to others to carry it forward.

Further reading:

Further reflections can be found in the Public Integrity special issue on Strategic Corruption. A forthcoming paper expanding further on these themes will be available soon on the Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) website (sign up to receive news here).