Introduction

Considering historical migration trends, robust cultural connections, and the economic and political dynamics in Southeastern Europe (SEE), the engagement potential of diaspora communities presents a fruitful research opportunity. Just imagine losing 10% of your national population in 10 years. In the context of discussions about overpopulation, migration, climate change, and sustainability, this might seem off-topic, but population loss is a common issue for SEE countries and as a result, diaspora communities from this region are some of the largest in Europe. Croatia is no exception, having lost a tenth of its population in only a decade. As a result, today Croatia is most dependent on private remittances and personal transfers out of all EU countries, amounting to 7.2% of Croatia’s GDP in 2023, or €5.61 billion.

The economic impact of the diaspora goes well beyond remittances alone, however. Diaspora members can invest in businesses, start-ups, and infrastructure, but usually face various obstacles (such as poor quality of institutions or bureaucracy). To address this issue, governments are increasingly seeking ways to (re)connect with their diaspora members and engage them from abroad, if not bring them back. Quite often, there’s no need to reinvent the wheel—learning from others can be effective. Our goal in this short article is to investigate diaspora mobilization initiatives in other Southeast European countries that could serve as good practices for engaging with Croatian emigrants.

Diaspora Engagement Policies

There exists a long-standing debate about who counts as diaspora and who does not. Anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, and economists look at the term from different angles and shed light on its different aspects. Here we follow Grossman’s definition of diaspora, according to which diaspora represents a ‘transnational community whose members (or their ancestors) emigrated or were dispersed from their original homeland but remain oriented to it and preserve a group identity.’ The fact that these people remain oriented to their origin country in some way signifies their potential for further engagement, which can be incentivized by using specific engagement policies.

The typology of diaspora engagement policies varies from author to author, but one of the most well-known typologies is developed by Gamlen. His typology, reproduced in Figure 1, identifies three different types of diaspora engagement policies: capacity-building policies, extending rights to diaspora, and extracting obligations from diaspora. The first one, capacity building, is divided into symbolic nation-building, which may include organizing language or culture classes, and institution building, by establishing ministries or agencies that deal with diaspora engagement. The second type, extending rights, deals with political incorporation, for example by giving voting rights to diaspora members or other types of civil and social rights. The third category is called extracting obligations and mostly relates to investment policies and/or investment promotion for diaspora members or lobbying for certain policies.

Figure 1: Gamlen’s typology of diaspora engagement policies

Whether it is to attract investment or secure more votes in upcoming elections from those living abroad, governments are increasingly seeking ways to engage with their diasporas. To this end, they may grant external voting rights, enable dual citizenship, or establish diaspora agencies, all of which have rapidly developed in the last 20 years (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Trends in State-Diaspora Relations

The following sections use Gamlen’s typology to examine which type of diaspora engagement policies have been predominantly used in SEE countries. Before this, some context is provided about the magnitude and trends with regard to this phenomenon in the region.

Population loss: a common denominator for SEE

Southeastern Europe is experiencing one of the most substantial depopulation trends in the world, and the European Commission has identified brain drain as one of the most significant issues affecting the region (Kondan 2020). For example, half of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population, and 42% of Albania’s population, lives abroad.

Migration is influenced by various push and pull factors widely covered in existing literature, including scarce economic prospects, political unrest, and the search for enhanced educational opportunities or better job conditions in Western Europe and North America. Studies have shown that large-scale emigration from Eastern Europe has mixed economic effects: while remittances and reduced unemployment provide short-term benefits, long-term challenges include labour shortages, brain drain, and demographic decline, all of which hinder economic growth and productivity. Taking into consideration current socio-economic indicators, the trend of depopulation is expected to continue, and it is projected that countries in Southeastern Europe will lose between 6.2% (Montenegro) and 22.5% (Bulgaria) of their population until 2050 (see Figure 3). What is more, brain drain has been on the rise in (South)Eastern Europe, and its effects are expected to be long-term in many aspects. From a contextual point of view, the brain drain should be seen as an issue that affects both sending and receiving countries and that interacts with ‘push’ factors in the former as well as ‘pull’ factors in the latter. Moreover, corruption in countries of origin significantly drives the outflow of high-skilled professionals, as they seek better institutional environments. This brain drain can further weaken economic development and institutional quality in the affected countries, creating a negative cycle.

Figure 3: Projected Population Change in Southeastern Europe, 2020-50

However, the increasing significance and successes of diaspora engagement strategies and initiatives throughout SEE offer a crucial testing ground for potential policy solutions, which could overturn the brain drain into brain gain and promote sustainable development. To achieve this, a cross-institutional approach in managing migration, including all stakeholders (public, private and non-governmental) in migration governance at national and local levels is needed. In that regard, collaboration with international organizations seems to play a vital role. The examples include, for instance, Serbian diaspora migration with the UNDP’s assistance and Romanian Brainmap with the assistance of EU funds.

How exactly does diaspora engagement work in practice? Mapping diaspora engagement initiatives in SEE

Over the past two decades, Southeastern European governments have expanded their traditional diaspora engagement—which includes naturalization laws, external voting rights, and cultural heritage support—by creating dedicated ministries and agencies and collaborating with NGOs and the private sector to strengthen ties with citizens abroad and those with shared ethnic heritage. Non-EU countries have collaborated extensively with international organizations on diaspora engagement, such as USAID or the World Bank. In this section, the policy landscape of diaspora engagement is analyzed by applying three sets of diaspora engagement policies: capacity building, extending rights, and extracting obligations.

Capacity-Building Policies

Capacity-building policies include symbolic nation building and institution building. With regard to symbolic nation building, all countries organize or offer some type of language or culture classes for diaspora members. In terms of institution building, all countries have at least an agency or a department dedicated to diaspora relations and engagement, while some countries also have specific ministries. This includes Kosovo’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Croatia’s Ministry for Demography and Immigration, and Montenegro’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs.

Extending rights

Extending rights involves political incorporation as well as the provision of civil and social rights. Political incorporation can be achieved, for example, by granting voting rights to diaspora members. This practice, which is implemented in some form in all EES countries, has been subjected to criticism due to the fact that diaspora members do not reside in the country but still influence electoral outcomes. In terms of civil and social rights, this may include allowing emigrants to access certain social security benefits or healthcare rights.

Extracting Obligations

According to Gamlen’s typology, investment policies and lobby promotion are part of extracting obligations from the diaspora. For example, the Diaspora Invest Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), launched in 2017 with a budget of US$6.6 million funded by USAID, successfully leveraged diaspora investments for economic development. Over its first four years, the project distributed US$2 million in grants to 164 companies, which invested over US$22 million of their own funds, increased sales by over 70%, and created 1,571 new jobs. The programme, which strengthened links between the diaspora and local communities, entered its second phase in 2022 with a budget of US$15.7 million.

Figure 4: Diaspora Invest Project, USAID

Furthermore, some countries, such as Romania and Croatia, are implementing schemes to support diaspora members to return to their home country and starting their own businesses. In Romania, this includes the third edition of the Startup Nation programme, which has seen 1,648 SMEs registered by Romanians returning from abroad. Croatia launched the ‘I Choose Croatia / Biram Hrvatsku’ scheme in January 2022, aiming to encourage the return of Croatian citizens under 60 from EEA and overseas countries by offering financial support for self-employment. In three years, the initiative has resulted in about 700 people returning, primarily to underdeveloped areas, mostly from Germany. It is important to note that neither of the measures was designed as a standalone measure, but rather as an addition to existing policy measures on supporting entrepreneurship. The mentioned strategies show that countries are committed to engage the diaspora as a factor of socio-economic development. However, some challenges persist in their implementation and funding, as well as in cooperation with local stakeholders.

Conclusion

Enhancing diaspora engagement requires a complex strategic approach that would include instruments such as targeted tax incentives for diaspora members investing in their home countries, the creation of diaspora investment funds to foster entrepreneurial projects, and programmes aimed at helping returning professionals reintegrate into local economies. Governments in Southeastern Europe are increasingly focusing on economic diaspora engagement, with countries like BiH collaborating with international organizations to achieve this goal. Building collaboration between the public and private sectors is recognized as a contributing factor through integrating skilled diaspora individuals, either by addressing labour market gaps or through innovation cooperation. Previously, the emphasis was more on cultural and linguistic connections as part of post-socialist nation-building efforts. In terms of symbolic nation building, all SEE countries continue to organize or offer language and culture classes for diaspora members. These activities have not ceased, but there is now a growing emphasis on incentivizing investments and fostering more substantial economic engagement with the diaspora. This shift aims to leverage the economic potential of the diaspora to contribute to the development and prosperity of their countries of origin.